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Abstract
The present paper studies the role of social security in an economy populated by
overlapping generations of individuals that have time-consistent or time-inconsistent
preferences, face mortality and individual income risk, borrowing constraints as well
as progressive income taxes. Our simulations start from an artiﬁcial equilibrium
where social security is completely neutral. Next we introduce successively alter-
native deviations from neutrality in order to isolate the various economic eﬀects of
social security. The latter are mainly the insurance provision against mortality and
income risk, the negative liquidity eﬀects for young households and the provision
of a commitment technology for present-biased hyperbolic consumers. Our simula-
tions indicate that the positive eﬀects of social security dominate the negative ones
for a wide range of parameter combinations. For our central parametrization social
security induces an overall welfare gain which amounts to roughly 1.5 percent of
aggregate resources in the hyperbolic model and a welfare loss of about 0.5 percent
of resources in the model with rational consumers.
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The eﬃciency consequences of pay-as-you-go ﬁnanced social security are debated since
a long time in the economic literature. Since the seminal article of Breyer (1989) it
has been acknowledged that social security serves as a pure redistribution device across
generations when all markets are perfect and labor supply is inelastic. This means that
the elimination (or “privatization”) of social security would generate no welfare gains for
future generations as long as all existing old generations are fully compensated. On order
to ﬁnance it’s obligations the government would have to raise taxes and debt that exactly
match the already existing implicit tax and debt burdens, see Geanakoplos et al. (1998)
or Sinn (2000).
Matters are diﬀerent when the central assumptions are relaxed. As Homburg (1990) or
Breyer and Straub (1993) have shown, social security privatization could generate eﬃ-
ciency gains if labor supply is elastic and beneﬁts are ﬂat. When beneﬁts are independent
of former contributions, the pension system is progressive. Consequently, privatization is
similar to a move from a progressive to a proportional labor income tax. Various sim-
ulation studies have quantiﬁed the labor market distortions and computed the resulting
eﬃciency gains from privatization, see for example Feldstein (1998). However, as demon-
strated by Fenge (1995), the unfunded pension system is Pareto-eﬃcient even with elastic
labor supply, if beneﬁts are perfectly linked to former contributions. In this case the
tax-like proportion of annual contributions is the same for all members of a cohort so
that an equivalent explicit tax is needed to ﬁnance the (implicit) public debt inherited
from the liquidated public system. This has two consequences. First, if the unfunded
pension system is intragenerational fair, the labor-leisure distortion cannot be reduced by
privatization as long as the tax structure is not altered. Second, improving (reducing)
the link between beneﬁts and contributions increases (reduces) economic eﬃciency, see
for example Kotlikoﬀ (1996) or Fehr (2000).
Up to now the discussion has abstracted from market imperfections. If the latter are taken
into account, eﬃciency gains (or losses) from social security privatization are possible, if
the pension system increases (or reduces) the extent of market failure. For example,
Demmel and Keuschnigg (2000) demonstrate that the pension system increases labor
market imperfections and, consequently, a debt-ﬁnanced Pareto-improving transition to a
funded system is possible. Corneo and Marquardt (2000) reach a similar conclusion in a
model with unemployment and endogenous growth. Hubbard and Judd (1987) point out
the role of social security with realistic capital market imperfections. Since it provides an
insurance against lifespan uncertainty, social security reduces the ineﬃciencies due to the
1market failure in the private provision of annuities. On the other hand, in the presence
of borrowing constraints social security will further increase the market failure so that
privatization induces additional eﬃciency gains.
Another direction of research has explored the role of social security in providing an insur-
ance against income uncertainty. ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu et al. (1995) develop a general equilibrium
model with overlapping generations with individuals facing mortality and income risk.
Private credit and annuity markets are closed by assumption. Agents supply labor inelas-
tically when they are given the opportunity to work, otherwise they receive unemployment
beneﬁts. After the mandatory retirement age, individuals rely on ﬂat-rate pension ben-
eﬁts. In this framework, social security provides an insurance against income risk and
lifespan uncertainty and increases the existing liquidity constraints of young individuals.
However, in the initial equilibrium (without social security) the growth rate of the econ-
omy exceeds the interest rate. Consequently, it is not surprising that the introduction
of social security increases the resources of all generations. ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu et al. (1999)
eliminate dynamic ineﬃciency by incorporating land as a ﬁxed factor of production. In
this setting, the introduction of social security has again positiv insurance and negative
liquidity eﬀects, but it also redistributes income across generations. While it turns out
that the long-run equilibrium without social security is optimal, the result might be due
to pure redistribution eﬀects. On the other hand, Fuster et al. (2003) ﬁnd that social
security increases steady-state welfare for most households if two-sided altruism is taken
into account. In this framework, the intergenerational redistribution induced by social
security is (at least partly) neutralized by intervivos transfers and bequests. In addition,
borrowing constraints are less binding so that social security mainly provides an insurance
against uninsurable “labor ability”shocks at birth. A ﬁnal argument in favor of social se-
curity is explored by ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu et al. (2003). Introducing quasi-hyperbolic discounting
in the above framework, they show that social security may raise long-run welfare for in-
dividuals with time-inconsistent preferences if the short-term discount rate is suﬃciently
high. Therefore, social security may serve as a commitment device for individuals who do
not adequately save for their retirement.
All studies with stochastic economies discussed so far share a common deﬁciency. Since
they only consider the long-run eﬀects of social security, the consequences for transitional
generations are completely neglected. Therefore, the computed long-run welfare changes
could be simply due to intergenerational redistribution. In order to provide a complete
assessment of social security, one has to compute the transition path between steady states
and separate intergenerational distribution from eﬃciency eﬀects. Consequently, Huang
et al. (1997) compare two experiments where the existing unfunded social security system
2is eliminated and a private or a mandatory state-run funded system is introduced with all
existing and transitional generations compensated virtually. While both experiments yield
a signiﬁcant aggregate eﬃciency gain, the government-run funding scheme is preferred
to privatization due to its superior insurance properties. Conesa and Krueger (1999)
extend the Huang et al. (1997) framework by including variable labor supply. They
simulate an immediate, a gradual and an announced elimination of social security and
compute the political support for the three proposals in the initial year. Although for all
cases considered agents would prefer to be born into the ﬁnal steady-state, no proposal
receives an initial voting majority in the closed economy case. The political support is
declining when intra-cohort heterogeneity is increasing due to the rising insurance gains
from ﬂat pensions. While Conessa and Krueger (1999) can explain why pension reforms
are delayed in democratic systems, their study does not include eﬃciency calculations. If
many individuals receive small welfare losses while the (fewer) winners receive enormous
welfare gains it might be possible that the reform receives no political support although
it delivers aggregate eﬃciency gains. A very similar problem arises in Fuster et al. (2006)
who extend their two-sided altruism model by incorporating variable labor supply and
the transition paths across steady states. As before the family insurance substitutes
the missing market insurance but now the social security contributions distort the labor
supply choice. The latter is reinforced by the fact that the payroll tax comes on top
of personal income taxes. Consequently, they ﬁnd that the majority of individuals are
better oﬀ with the elimination of social security in all privatization schemes considered.
However, since the resulting welfare changes are not aggregated across individuals and
generations, the overall eﬃciency eﬀect is not explicitly determined.
The latter is done by Nishiyama and Smetters (2005a) who simulate a stylized 50-percent
privatization of the US social security system. Again, the considered reform reduces the
labor supply distortions but also the insurance provision of the social security system. In
order to isolate the overall eﬃciency eﬀects, the authors follow Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ
(1987) by introducing a Lump-Sum Redistribution Authority (LSRA) which compensates
initial agents and distributes the accumulated assets (i.e. eﬃciency gains) or debt (i.e.
eﬃciency losses) to newborn and future agents. They ﬁnd substantial eﬃciency gains
from privatization, if wage shocks could be insured privately. Consequently, if income
uncertainty is perfectly insured, the aggregate eﬃciency eﬀect of social security is dom-
inated by the distortions of the labor/leisure choice. However, if wage income shocks
could not be insured, the overall eﬃciency eﬀect from privatization is negative. This
clearly indicates that the (positive) insurance eﬀects of the US social security system
dominate the distortionary eﬀects on labor supply. Fehr and Habermann (2005) reach a
3similar conclusion for the German social security system. In contrast to the US system,
beneﬁts in the German system are strongly linked to former contributions. On the one
hand, this institutional feature minimizes labor supply distortions but at the same time
it also reduces the insurance provision against income shocks. Our simulations show that
a more progressive system would yield a signiﬁcant aggregate eﬃciency again, if all initial
generations are compensated by LSRA transfers.
The current study directly supplements our previous one. However, instead of varying
it’s progressivity, we privatize the social security system and ﬁnance the existing social
security claims by a mixture of debt and labor taxation. In order to isolate self-control
problems, we compare economies populated either by rational or hyperbolic individuals.
In contrast to previous studies, we separate and quantify the insurance, liquidity and labor
supply eﬀects implied by social security. Consequently, we compute our model with and
without income uncertainty and start our analysis from artiﬁcial equilibria, where social
security is completely neutral. Then we introduce successively alternative assumptions
that advance our model closer to reality and allow to separate the eﬀects that are at work.
Our simulation results indicate that the German social security system clearly enhances
aggregate eﬃciency if the economy is populated by hyperbolic consumers. The results are
mixed with rational consumers. Here, social security increases eﬃciency with proportional
taxes, but decreases eﬃciency with progressive taxes.
The next section, discusses how we model preferences as well as the tax and beneﬁt
system. Section 3 explains the calibration and simulation approach. Finally, section 4
presents the simulation results and section 5 oﬀers some concluding remarks.
2 The model economy
2.1 Demographics and intracohort heterogeneity
We consider an economy populated by overlapping generations of individuals which may
live up to a maximum possible lifespan of J periods. At each date, a new generation is
b o r nw h e r ew eh a v en o r m a l i z e di t ss i z eN1 = 1, i.e. we assume zero population growth.
Individuals might face lifespan uncertainty with ψj ≤ 1 the time-invariant conditional
survival probability from age j − 1t oa g ej, i.e. Nj = ψjNj−1 and ψJ+1 =0 .
Our model is solved recursively. Consequently, an agent faces the state vector zj =
(j,aj,ep j,e j)w h e r ej ∈J= {1,...,J} is the household’s age, aj ∈ A =[ amin,a max]
denotes assets held at the beginning of age j, epj ∈ P =[ epmin,ep max] deﬁnes the agent’s
accumulated earning points for public pension claims and ej ∈ Ej =[ emin
j ,e max
j ]i st h e
4individual productivity at age j.
We distinguish environments with and without individual earnings uncertainty. In the
case with certain income, we assume only one age-productivity proﬁle so that there exists
one representative agent for each cohort, i.e. emin
j = emax
j for all j ∈J. With uncertain
income the productivity state is assumed to follow a ﬁrst-order Markov process described
in more detail below. Consequently, each age-j cohort is fragmented into subgroups ξ(zj),
according to the initial distribution (j = 1), the Markov process and optimal decisions
(j>1). Let X(zj) be the corresponding cumulated measure to ξ(zj). Hence,
 
A×P×Ej
dX(zj) = 1 for all j =1 ,...,J
must hold, as ξ(zj) is not aﬀected by cohort sizes but only gives densities within cohorts.
In the following, we concentrate on the long run equilibrium and omit the time index t and
the state index zj for every variable whenever possible. Agents are then only distinguished
a c c o r d i n gt ot h e i ra g ej.
2.2 Budget constraints and bequests
The budget constraint is deﬁned as follows:
aj+1 =a j(1 + r)+wj(1 − τj)+pj − T(yj) − (1 + τc)cj + bj aj ≥ a ∀ j. (1)
with a1 =a J+1 = 0. In addition to interest income from savings raj, households receive
gross labor income wj = w(1− j)ej during their working period as well as public pensions
pj during retirement. As time endowment is normalized to one,  j deﬁnes leisure con-
sumption and w the wage rate for eﬀective labor. They have to pay income taxes T(yj)
which depend on taxable income yj and the tax schedule T(·). Due to a contribution
ceiling the pension contribution rate τj depends on income. The price of consumption
goods cj includes consumption taxes τc and bj deﬁnes the accidental bequests received at
age j. Finally, assets might be restricted to a speciﬁc ﬂoor a.
Our model abstracts from annuity markets. Consequently, private assets of all agents
who died are aggregated and then distributed among all working age cohorts following an
exogenous age- and productivity-dependent distribution scheme Γ(j,ej), i.e.






(1 + r)ai+1(zi)dX(zi) for all j =1 ,...,J. (2)
5The age distribution of bequests is computed in the initial steady state where we assume
that the heirs always receive the assets of the generation which was 25 years older1.I n
order to reﬂect empirical evidence and to highlight their stochastic nature, we assume that
bequests are distributed within a generation proportional to the current productivity level
ej.
2.3 Individual preferences and consumer welfare
Our model assumes a preference structure that is represented by a time-separable, nested
CES utility function. In order to isolate risk aversion from intertemporal substitution, we
follow the approach of Epstein and Zin (1991) and formulate the maximization problem
of a representative consumer recursively.
We distinguish between rational and hyperbolic consumers. The former exhibit time-
consistent preferences and consequently do not regret their previous decisions in the fu-
ture. Following the seminal work of Strotz (1956), we model the decision problem of a
hyperbolic consumer as an intrapersonal game between a sequence of “selves”with con-
ﬂicting preferences. Taking the strategies of his future selves as given the current self
picks a strategy that is optimal from his own perspective.
The consumer at age j and state zj ﬁrst has to forecast his future actions. His future self
(who is at age j + 1) will maximize the objective function
max
ˆ cj+1,ˆ  j+1
 
u(ˆ cj+1, ˆ  j+1)
1− 1






by choosing consumption and leisure. If lifespan is uncertain, the expected utility in future
periods is discounted with δ and weighted with the survival probability ψj+2. The litera-
ture distinguishes between so called “naive”and “sophisticated”hyperbolic consumers, see
O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999). The former think that their future selves will behave in a
time-consistent manner despite the fact that they have consistently violated this belief in
the past, i.e. ˆ β = 1. The latter correctly foresee that their future selves will also behave
in a time-inconsistent way, i.e. ˆ β = β where β deﬁnes the discount rate of the current
selves2. Consequently, ˆ cj+1 and ˆ  j+1 denote the believe of the current self about his future
actions. The expectation operator E in (3) indicates that future utilities are computed
1If heirs would be younger than 20, then heirs are age-group 20-24 and similar if heirs would be older
than jR−1, then heirs are jR−1.
2Of course, it would be no problem to consider also intermediate cases where ˆ β ∈ (β,1).
6over the distribution of ej+2, i.e.







where πj+1(·) denotes the age-dependent probability at age j+1 to experience productivity
ej+2 in the next period if the current productivity is ej+1. The parameters γ and η deﬁne
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure in diﬀerent
years and the degree of (relative) risk aversion. Note that for the special case η = 1
γ we
are back at the traditional expected utility speciﬁcation, see Epstein and Zin (1991, 266).
The value function ˆ V (·) for future beliefs (with ˆ cj and ˆ  j from (3)) is computed for any
age j =2 ,...,J from
ˆ V (zj)=
 
u(ˆ cj, ˆ  j)
1− 1


















subject to the budget constraint (1) and aj ≥ a and given his believes E[ˆ V ]a b o u tt h e
behavior of his future selves. Note that the decision functions cj(zj)a n d j(zj)d e n o t e












The time-inconsistency in preferences is evident from the fact that the β, ˆ β terms appear in
the decision problems (3) and (5) but not in the calculation of the value functions (4) and
(6). It should also be clear that for β = ˆ β the decision and value functions of the beliefs
ˆ cj, ˆ  j and ˆ V and the respective functions of the actual behavior cj,  j and V coincide.
Consequently, sophisticated hyperbolic consumers (where β = ˆ β<1) behave diﬀerently
compared to time-consistent consumers (i.e. where β = ˆ β = 1) but the solution algorithm
is quite similar. For naive hyperbolic consumers (i.e. where β<1a n dˆ β = 1) the decision
function and the respective value functions of current and future selves do not coincide so
that the computational algorithm has to be speciﬁed diﬀerently. In the following we only
report the results with naive hyperbolic consumers, since for our calibration the results
with sophisticated hyperbolic consumers were very similar3.
3Of course, simulation results with sophisticated consumers are available upon request.











where ρ denotes the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between consumption and
leisure at each age j, while α deﬁnes the age-independent leisure preference parameter.
2.4 The production side
Firms in this economy use capital and labor to produce a single good according to the
Cobb-Douglas production technology Y =  KεL1−ε where Y,K and L are aggregate
output, capital and labor, ε is capital’s share in production, and   deﬁnes a technology
parameter. Capital depreciates at a constant rate δk and ﬁrms have to pay corporate




where the corporate tax rate τk is applied to the output net
of labor costs and depreciation. Firms maximize proﬁts renting capital and hiring labor
from the households so that marginal products equal r the interest rate for capital and w
the wage rate for eﬀective labor.
2.5 The government sector
Our model distinguishes between the tax system and the pension system. In each period
the government issues new debt ΔB and collects taxes from households and ﬁrms in order
to ﬁnance general government expenditures G as well as interest payments on its debt.
We assume that public debt to output ratio is 60 percent in the benchmark case. General
government expenditures G consist of government purchases of goods and services which








In the initial long run equilibrium we set τc exogenous and compute G endogenous from
G = Ty + Tk + τcC − rBG, (8)
where C deﬁnes aggregate consumption (see (17)).
We assume that contributions to public pensions are exempted from tax while the beneﬁts
are fully taxed. Consequently, taxable gross income yj is computed from gross labor
income net of pension contributions and a ﬁxed work related allowance dw, nominal4
4In order to reﬂect realistic features of capital income taxation in a model without inﬂation, we assume
for taxation purposes a nominal interest rate ˆ r, i.e. real interest rate r plus a ﬁctive inﬂation. The latter
exacerbates the distortions of real capital income taxation, see Feldstein (1997).
8c a p i t a li n c o m en e to fas a v i n ga l l o w a n c eds and - after retirement - public pensions.
yj =m a x [ wj(1 − τj) − dw;0]+max[ˆ raj − ds;0]+pj. (9)
Given taxable income, we either apply a proportional tax rate (¯ τyj)o rt h ep r o g r e s s i v e
tax code of 2005 in Germany [T05(yj)].
In each year, the pension system pays old-age beneﬁts and collects payroll contributions
from wage income below the contribution ceiling which is ﬁxed at two times the average
income ¯ w. Individual pension beneﬁts pj of a retiree of age j ≥ jR in a speciﬁc year
are computed from the product of his earning points epjR the retiree has accumulated at
retirement and the actual pension amount (APA) of the respective year:
pj = epjR × APA. (10)
The accumulated earning points depend on the relative income position min[wj/¯ w;2]of
the worker at working age j<j R. Since the contribution ceiling is ﬁxed at the double
of average income ¯ w, the maximum earning points that could be collected per year are 2.
Accumulated earning points at age j are therefore
epj+1 = epj(1 + ¯ r)+m i n [ wj/¯ w;2]· μ(¯ r), (11)
where ¯ r denotes an “internal interest factor”for accumulated earning points and ep1 =0 .
In order to keep the pension level constant, we reduce the initial level of earning points
received proportionally whenever we consider ¯ r>0, i.e. μ(0) = 1,μ  (¯ r) < 05.
The budget of the pension system must be balanced in the long run. The aggregated















Households don’t pay contribution on income above the contribution ceiling. The general





5More speciﬁcally, we compute μ(¯ r)=( jR − 1)/(
 jR−1
i=1 (1 + ¯ r)jR−1−i).
9Note that the general social security contribution rate τ which is calculated from (12) is
not necessarily identical with the individual contribution rates in the budget constraint
(1). The latter is given by
τj =
 
τ if wj ≤ 2¯ w,
τ2¯ w/wj if wj > 2¯ w.
(13)
2.6 Equilibrium and the computational method
Given the ﬁscal policy {G,BG,τ k,T(y),τ c,τ}, a stationary recursive equilibrium is a set
of value functions {V (zj)}J
j=1, household decision rules {cj(zj),  j(zj)}J
j=1, distribution of
unintended bequest {b(zj)}J
j=1, time-invariant measures of households {ξ(zj)}J
j=1,r e l a t i v e
prices of labor and capital {w,r} such that the following conditions are satisﬁed:
1. given ﬁscal policy, factor prices and bequests, households’ decision rules solve the
households decision problem (5);
2. factor prices are competitive, i.e.





































ajdX(zj) − BG (18)
while in the small open economy aggregate capital is derived from (15);
4. Let 1h=x be an indicator function that returns 1 if h = x and 0 if h  = x. Then, the




1aj+1=aj+1(zj) × 1epj+1=epj+1(zj)πj(ej+1,e j)dX(zj).













6. the government budget (8) as well as the budget of the pension system (12) are
balanced intertemporally;
7. the goods market clears, i.e.
Y = C + δkK + G (closed economy)
Y = C + δkK + G + NX (open economy)
with NX as net exports.
The computation method follows the Gauss-Seidel procedure of Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ
(1987). For the initial steady state which reﬂects the current German social security
system described above we start with a guess for aggregate variables, bequests distribution
and exogenous policy parameters. Then we compute the factor prices and the individual
decision rules and value functions. The latter involves the discretization of the state space
which is explained in the appendix. Next we obtain the distribution of households and
aggregate assets, labor supply and consumption as well as the social security tax rate and
the consumption tax rate that balances government budgets. This information allows
us to update the initial guesses. The procedure is repeated until the initial guesses and
the resulting values for capital, labor, bequests and endogenous taxes have suﬃciently
converged.
Next we solve for the transition path where social security is completely eliminated. We
assume that the transition between the initial and the ﬁnal steady state takes 4 × J
periods. With alternative policy parameters we assume in the ﬁrst guess that aggregate
values and bequests of the initial equilibrium would remain constant along the transition.
Then we update for each period of the transition the individual and aggregate variables
until we reach convergence.
3 Calibration of the initial equilibrium
In order to reduce computational time, each model period covers ﬁve years. Agents start
life at age 20 (j = 1), are forced to retire at age 60 (jR = 9) and face a maximum
11possible life span of 100 years (J = 16). The conditional survival probabilities ψj are
computed from the year 2000 Life Tables reported in Bomsdorf (2003). With respect to
the preference parameters we set the intertemporal elasticity of substitution γ to 0.5, the
intratemporal elasticity of substitution ρ to 0.6, and the leisure preference parameter α
to 1.5. This is within the range of commonly used values, see Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ
(1987, 52f.) or Fehr (1999, 57). In addition, the implied compensated wage elasticity of
labor supply is 0.34 in our benchmark, which is in line with the results of Fenge et al.
(2006). The coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion η is set at 4.0 in the benchmark. Values
between 1 and 5 for η are typically perceived as reasonable in the literature, see Cecchetti
et al. (2000, 792) for a discussion. Finally, with respect to the time preference rates β
and δ we distinguish two combinations which both yield a realistic wealth to income ratio.
Following Angeletos et al. (2001, 54) we assume that the rational consumer (i.e. β =1 )
has a lower discount factor δ than the hyperbolic consumer. In order to calibrate a realistic
capital to output ratio, the discount factor for the rational consumer is set at 0.9 which
implies an annual discount rate of about 2 percent. Next we specify for the hyperbolic
consumer β =0 .75. In order to calibrate the same capital to output ratio we have to
assume δ =1 .0. Angeletos et al. (2001, 54) report that β =0 .7 is typically measured
in laboratory experiments. While they also assume higher annual discount rates, the
reported diﬀerence between the hyperbolic and rational consumer is quite similar. Figure
1 compares the discount functions and also includes a strong hyperbolic case which is
used in the sensitivity analysis.
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With respect to technology parameters we chose the general factor productivity   =1 .5
in order to normalize labor income and set the capital share in production ε at 0.3. The
annual depreciation rate for capital is set at δk =0 .06. The actual pension amount
12(APA) in equation (10) is computed in order to yield a standard pension (i.e. where
epjR = jR − 1) which amounts to 60 percent of net average earnings ¯ wn. This procedure
yields a realistic contribution rate for Germany. As already explained, the taxation of
gross income (from labor, capital and pensions) is close to the current German income
tax code and the marginal tax rate schedule introduced in 2005 (including solidarity tax).
Consequently, after the basic allowance of 7800 e the marginal tax rate rises linearly from
15.8 to maximum of 44.3 percent when taxable income yj passes 52.000 e. We assume
that our individuals are married couples with a sole wage earner and apply the German
income splitting method. There exists a special allowance for labor income of dw = 1200
e while for capital income the special allowance amounts to ds = 3600 e (per couple)6.
Finally, the corporate tax rate is set at τk =0 .15.
In order to model the income process, we distinguish six productivity proﬁles across the
life cycle. Fehr (1999) has estimated ﬁve such proﬁles from data of the German Socio-
Economic Panel Study (SOEP). We split up the proﬁle of the lowest income class in order
to improve the income distribution. When an agent enters the labor market (at age 20-24)
he belongs to the lowest productivity level with a probability of 10 percent, to the second
lowest again with 10 percent and to higher levels with 20 percent, respectively. After
the initial period, agents change their productivity levels according to the age-speciﬁc
Markov transition matrices which are reported in the appendix. The latter are computed
also from SOEP data for diﬀerent years between 1984 and 2001. Speciﬁcally we sorted
the primary earners of the years 1984, 1990 and 1996 into seven cohorts and divided them
within each cohort into six income classes. Then we compiled for each cohort and income
class the respective income classes of its members in the surveys of the years 1989, 1995
and 2001 in order to calculate the age-speciﬁc transition matrices.
Table 1 reports the calibrated benchmark equilibria for rational consumers with stochastic
and non-stochastic income. Both equilibria feature a consumption tax rate of 17 percent,
progressive income taxes, borrowing constraints and lifespan uncertainty. The model with
stochastic income is simulated as a closed economy in order to get the values of Table 1.
Consequently, the interest rate is endogenous and the trade balance is zero. In Table 3
nearly all simulations take place in a small open economy, but the interest rate is always
like in Table 1. In the model without income uncertainty we omit intragenerational
heterogeneity and apply the productivity proﬁle of the median income class. In order
to calibrate a similar initial equilibrium, we keep the interest rate from the respective
6In Germany this allowance is currently 3000 e for nominal interest income, but 6000 e if the source
of capital income are dividends.
13stochastic income model constant and assume a small open economy. In addition, we
reduce the share of married couples in order to ﬁnance the same level of public goods as
in the uncertain income model. Consequently, the average income tax rate is higher with
non-stochastic income.
Table 1: The initial equilibrium (rational consumers)
Stochastic Non-stochastic
income income
Pension beneﬁts (% of GDP) 13.2 13.7
Pension contribution rate (in %) 19.5 19.5
Tax revenues (in % of GDP) 20.1 20.1
Average income tax rate (in %) 7.8 10.3
Interest rate p.a. (in %) 3.4 3.4
Bequest (in % of GDP) 4.1 1.4
Capital-output ratio 2.9 2.9
Gini index net income 0.292 –
Gini index wealth 0.519 –
Borrowing constraints (in %)
age 20-24 20.0 100
age 25-29 7.5 100
age 30-34 5.8 100
Note that in the uncertain income model the lowest two productivity classes of the
youngest cohort would like to borrow because they expect a higher productivity (and
therefore income) in the future. For older cohorts, the fraction of liquidity constraint
agents decreases sharply. After age 35 we hardly observe liquidity constraints. Since the
need for precautionary savings vanishes with certain income, representative agents in the
young cohorts would like to consume more compared to the uncertain income case. Con-
sequently, they hit their borrowing restrictions. Bequests decrease and the small open
economy experiences capital inﬂows. The consumption to output ratio decreases and the
reduced consumption tax revenues have to be balanced by higher income tax revenues.
We do not report the respective equilibria for hyperbolic consumers since they are very
similar. Of course, hyperbolic consumers would like to consume more when they are young
compared to rational consumers. Consequently, borrowing constraints are more binding
for them and the share of constrained consumers in the youngest cohorts increases to 40
and 15.1 percent respectively. In addition, the bequest share of GDP is reduced to 3.9
percent.
This should suﬃce to explain our calibration and initial equilibrium. Next we turn to the
14policy reforms and their risk-sharing and eﬃciency implications.
4 Simulation results
This section compares the macroeconomic and welfare consequences if the existing pay-as-
you-go ﬁnanced pension system is phased out and substituted by private savings. Since we
don’t want to hurt existing elderly and already retired agents, we simply change equation
(11) to
epj = epj−1(1 + ¯ r). (20)
Consequently, individuals will keep their existing earning points, but they will not accu-
mulate additional ones in the future. We assume that the existing pension claims are still
ﬁnanced by contributions on labor income. However, in order to smooth the burden across




t=1 PB t(1 + r)1−t
 ∞
t=1 PC t(1 + r)1−t. (21)
Since with this payroll tax rate the budget of the pension system is not balanced in every
period, pension debt BP develops as8
BP,t+1 =( 1+r)BP,t + PB t − τPCt (22)
with BP,0 = BP,1 =0 .
Similarly, for the general government budget we compute a time-invariant consumption
tax rate τc that balances the intertemporal government budget and endogenizes the debt




t=1 [Gt − Tk,t − Ty,t](1+r)1−t
 ∞
t=1 Ct(1 + r)1−t , (23)
and
BG,t+1 = BG,t(1 + r)+Gt − Ty,t − τcCt − Tk,t. (24)
Before the numerical results of the simulations are presented, we ﬁrst explain the compu-
tation of the welfare changes.
7In the closed economy (1 + r)1−t has to be replaced with Πt
k=1(1 + rk)−1.
8Of course, pension debt has to be included in the capital market equation (18) above.
154.1 Experimental design and social welfare
The welfare criterion we use to assess this reform is ex-ante expected utility of an agent,
before the productivity level is revealed (i.e. looking upon her life behind the Rawlsian veil










From that point of view one has some desire for redistribution, which provides insurance
for being born as a low-productivity type. Following Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ (1987, 87)
we compute the proportional increase in consumption and leisure (W) which would make
an agent in the baseline scenario as well oﬀ as in the reform scenario. If the expected
utility level after the reform is ˆ V and the expected utility level on the baseline path is ¯ V ,









Consequently, a value of W =1 .0 indicates that this agent would need one percent more
resources in the baseline scenario to attain expected utility ˆ V .
In order to asses the aggregate eﬃciency consequences, we introduce a Lump-Sum Redis-
tribution Authority (LSRA) in the spirit of Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ (1987, 65f.) as well
as Nishiyama and Smetters (2005a, 2005b) or Fehr and Habermann (2005). The LSRA
pays a lump-sum transfer (or levies a lump-sum tax) to each living household in the ﬁrst
period of the transition to bring their expected utility level back to the level of the initial
equilibrium. Since utility depends on age and state, these transfers (or taxes) have to
be computed for every agent in the ﬁrst year of the transition. Note that transfers diﬀer
only between the states of age j, earning points epj and asset holdings aj but not between
eﬃciencies for agents with the same j, epj and aj. This is due to the fact that the reform
is announced before the productivity shock is revealed. Consequently, age-j agents who
were alive in the initial equilibrium are compensated by the transfers vj,1(zj, ¯ V (zj)), which
guaranties for each individual at state zj the initial expected utility level ¯ V (zj). On the
other hand, those who enter the labor market in period t of the transition receive a trans-
fer v1,t(V ∗) which guaranties them an expected utility level V ∗. Note that the transfers
v1,t may diﬀer among future cohorts but the expected utility level V ∗ is identical for all.












1−t =0 . (26)
With V ∗ > ¯ V (i.e. W>0), all households in period one who have lived in the previous
period would be as well oﬀ as before the reform and all current and future newborn
households would be strictly better oﬀ. Hence, the new policy is Pareto improving after
lump-sum redistributions. With V ∗ < ¯ V (i.e. W<0), the policy reform is Pareto inferior
after lump-sum redistributions.
4.2 Stylized reform experiments
In order to ﬁx the economic intuition, we apply our model ﬁrst to some stylized reform
experiments which are intended to isolate the various economic eﬀects which are at work.
Starting point is a simulation where we replicate the “neutrality reform”experiment of
Fenge (1995). The original theoretical model considers two overlapping generations and
excludes the tax system. Consequently, in order to keep the implicit tax rate constant
across the life cycle until retirement, we have to model a pension system where the internal
interest factor is equal to the market interest rate, i.e. ¯ r = r in equations (11) and (20).
In addition, we abstract from lifespan uncertainty (i.e. ψj =1 .0a n dJ = 12), borrowing
constraints (i.e. a = −∞) and interest taxation (i.e. ds = ∞). Besides the pension
system which now levies a contribution rate of 21 percent, the public sector comprises a
proportional labor income tax of 10 percent (i.e. dw = 0), a corporate tax of 15 percent,
a consumption tax of 17 percent and a public debt level which amounts to 60 percent of
GDP.
The ﬁrst column of Table 2 reports the resulting macroeconomic eﬀects. In order to
ﬁnance all existing pension claims accumulated in the pre-reform years, a payroll tax of
13.4 percent is necessary. The reduction of the contribution rate (7.6 percentage points)
deﬁnes the implicit savings share, see Sinn (2000). The new payroll tax equals the previous
implicit tax rate so that labor supply is not aﬀected. However, due to the reduced pension
contributions (which are still tax exempt), labor income tax revenues increase, so that
public debt could be reduced. During the transition, tax revenues from public pensions
decline to zero. Since the latter eﬀect is stronger than the former, public debt has to be
lower in the long run in order to keep the budget balanced. As a result of the reform, the
future tax payments on pensions are now already payed during the working period. There
is no gain in present value neither for the household nor for the government. In essence,
some implicit government tax claims have been made explicit. At the household side,
17Table 2: Macroeconomic eﬀects of social security
Neutrality Benchmark reforms with stochastic income
reform proportional taxes progressive taxes
Consumers rational rational naive rational naive
Assetsa
2010-14 5.0 7.5 7.7 8.2 8.8
2015-19 10.7 16.2 16.8 17.9 19.2
2025-29 23.4 35.7 36.9 40.3 42.9
∞ 49.2 92.6 95.9 107.6 114.0
Capital stock/Labor supply/Outputa
2005-09 0.0 0.2 0.4 -1.0 -0.9
2015-19 0.0 0.4 0.5 -0.5 -0.4
2025-29 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.6 -0.8
∞ 0.0 -6.3 -6.7 -7.2 -7.7
Public debtb
2010-14 57.5 61.1 61.3 63.6 64.1
2015-19 54.6 61.9 62.4 65.7 66.6
2025-29 48.2 63.3 64.6 68.0 69.9
∞ 35.2 76.2 80.1 75.5 79.7
Pension debtb
2010-14 25.2 25.3 25.1 26.0 25.8
2015-19 53.7 53.0 52.5 54.3 54.0
2025-29 117.4 110.0 109.5 112.1 111.7
∞ 246.3 220.0 220.4 223.3 223.9
Consumption tax ratec
2005- 0.0 -1.0 -1.0 -2.6 -2.7
Contribution ratec
2005- -7.6 -7.5 -7.5 -7.4 -7.3
aChanges are reported in percentage over initial equilibrium. bIn percent of GDP.
cChanges in percentage points.
the additional income available to young working agents is saved so that assets increase
throughout the transition. On the domestic capital market, the additional supply of assets
is balanced by additional demand of the pension system. Since revenues from (lower)
contributions are not suﬃcient to ﬁnance the beneﬁts of the (still existing) retirees, the
deﬁcit is ﬁnanced by debt. The ﬁrst column of Table 2 shows that the existing implicit debt
of the pension system amounts to roughly 250 percent of GDP. However, on the capital
market the additional demand is exactly balanced by additional supply. Consequently, the
equilibrium interest rate is not changed in the closed economy and international capital
ﬂows are not aﬀected in the open economy. Note that the corporation tax does not alter
the neutrality result since the capital stock is neither altered in the closed nor in the open
18economy.
Of course, since the considered policy reform exactly reproduces the neutrality result of
Fenge (1995), welfare of households remains constant9. While Table 2 reports the results
for the model with stochastic income and rational consumers, the described economic
adjustment is almost completely identical in the model with hyperbolic consumers. On
ﬁrst sight one might have expected something diﬀerent since social security serves as a
commitment device for hyperbolic consumers. However, in a world without borrowing
constraints consumers who lack the foresight to save adequately for their retirement years
will simply reduce their initial debt when social security is eliminated.
Next we alter successively the diﬀerent assumptions which are necessary to obtain the
neutrality result in order to quantify their importance. First, we eliminate the weights
for the earning points, i.e. we set ¯ r = 0 in order to replicate the existing German earning
points system where the weights of the accumulated earning points are independent of
the age. As a result, implicit tax rate is falling with rising working age, see Fehr (2000)
or Fenge et al. (2006).
Figure 2: Contribution, implicit tax, and payroll tax rate
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Figure 2 shows the relation between contribution rates and implicit tax rates across the
life cycle. The implicit tax rate ˜ τj distorts labor supply and depends on the present value
of the pension increase due to your actual contributions. If an age-j agent earns the
average income ¯ w, his future pension rises by the amount of APA. His contributions in
9Apart from the pedagogic insights, this exercise also allows to examine the accuracy of the model
results. In order to reduce computational time we have to limit the grid size which automatically decreases
the accuracy of the results. All computed welfare changes are within the range [−0.01;0.01] percent of
remaining resources.
19that period are τ ¯ w, the implicit tax rate (for ¯ r = 0) amounts to












Whether this age-proﬁle of marginal contribution rates is eﬃcient depends on the age-
proﬁle of compensated labor supply elasticities. Recently, Fenge et al. (2006) have shown
that the latter decrease with age for males while females show a inversely U-shaped age-
proﬁle of compensated labor-supply elasticities. Our model does not distinguish between
genders but can distinguish between diﬀerent income processes. With stochastic income,
the compensated labor-supply elasticity proﬁle rises from 0.22 (age 20-24) to 0.48 (age
55-59). The reason is that we observe at young age a precautionary motive for labor
supply which vanishes with higher savings (and rising age). With non-stochastic income
this precautionary motive is missing, consequently the compensated labor supply proﬁle
is almost ﬂat and slightly falls from 0.29 (age 20-24) to 0.26 (age 55-59). Consequently,
the age-independent payroll tax proﬁle after the reform will reduce eﬃciency compared to
the existing pay-as-you-go system in the stochastic income model and increase eﬃciency
in the non-stochastic model. The reform experiments of simulation (1) in Table 3 exactly
yield this results. However, the computed eﬃciency eﬀects are rather small. This indicates
that a reform of the existing point system in Germany as recently proposed by Fenge et al.
(2006) has only minor eﬃciency consequences. Note that the reported eﬃciency eﬀects
are now computed by implementing LSRA transfers as described in the previous section.
The reform experiments of simulation (2) introduce a capital income tax of 10 percent in
the initial equilibrium. The transition to a private pension system now increases capital
income tax revenues without increasing distortions but allows in turn to reduce consump-
tion taxes. The lower intratemporal distortions increase economic eﬃciency slightly. In
addition, as shown by Nishiyama and Smetters (2005b), the rising tax revenues from cap-
ital income improve the insurance properties of the tax system in the stochastic income
model, which explains the stronger increase in the stochastic income case.
Next, the experiments of simulation (3) assume that the initial equilibrium also features
borrowing constraints (i.e. a =0 .0). The transition to the private system signiﬁcantly
reduces these liquidity constraints due to the lower payroll tax rate. The diﬀerences in the
reported eﬃciency eﬀects can be explained as follows. First, young low productive agents
in the stochastic income model may climb up to higher productivity proﬁles in the future.
Therefore, they can expect higher future income levels than young agents in the certain
income model where future wages only increase due to the rising age-productivity proﬁle.
Consequently, although the fraction of constrained agents is lower, liquidity constraints
20Table 3: Eﬃciency eﬀects of social security∗
Rational Naive hyperbolic
consumers consumers
Simulation Economic environment income income
number ¯ τψ j a ds stochastic certain stochastic certain
1. Stylized reform experiments with proportional taxes
(1) 0.1 1.0 −∞ ∞ -0.09 0.04 -0.08 0.12
(2) 0.1 1.0 −∞ 0.0 0.14 0.12 0.13 0.22
(3) 0.1 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.07 0.36 0.34 -0.29
(3a) η =0 .0 1.32 – 0.50 –
(3b) γ =0 .25 3.07 1.24 1.98 0.04
(3c) ρ =0 .2 1.43 0.31 0.52 -0.29
2. The benchmark reform with proportional taxes
(4) 0.1 < 1.0 0.0 0.0 -0.42 -0.95 -2.12 -2.61
(4a) η =0 .0 0.55 – -1.16 –
(4b) γ =0 .25 2.24 0.35 0.40 -1.62
(4c) ρ =0 .2 -0.56 -0.70 -2.52 -2.26
(4d) β =0 .6,δ=1 .1 – – -3.61 -3.69
3. The benchmark reform with progressive taxes
(5) T05 < 1.0 0.0 1800 0.49 -2.81 -1.49 -5.65
(5a) η =0 .0 0.17 – -1.94 –
(5b) γ =0 .25 3.00 -1.30 1.20 -4.01
(5c) ρ =0 .2 1.28 -2.39 -0.85 -4.84
(5d) β =0 .6,δ=1 .1 – – -3.23 -7.52
(5e) closed economy 0.53 – -1.44 –
∗In percent of remaining resources.
are more binding in the stochastic income model so that the reduction generates higher
eﬃciency gains. Second, since hyperbolic consumers regret their consumption behavior
at young age later in their life, borrowing constraints in combination with social security
serve as a commitment device for them. The considered reform reduces this commitment
technology. Consequently, the resulting consumption path is stronger distorted towards
the present, inducing eﬃciency losses for hyperbolic consumers. As shown in the last
column of Table 3, the latter eﬀect may dominate the former in the case of non-stochastic
income so that hyperbolic consumers experience even eﬃciency losses from the relaxation
of the commitment technology.
These stylized experiments suﬃce to highlight the importance of borrowing constraints
for the analysis of pension provision. They are not only important in their magnitude,
21but they also work in quite opposite directions for rational and hyperbolic consumers.
4.3 Benchmark reforms with proportional and progressive taxes
Simulation (4) introduces uncertain lifespan in the initial equilibrium (i.e. ψj =< 1.0).
Now our models’ results could be directly compared to other studies. The second and the
third column of Table 2 compare the macroeconomic eﬀects of this reform for rational
and hyperbolic consumers in the stochastic income model. Since the initial equilibria are
calibrated quite similar, the eﬀect of privatization on the payroll tax rate and the debt
level of the pension system is almost identical as in the case of the neutrality reform.
Individual assets increase now much stronger compared to the latter case, since savings
also insure against lifespan uncertainty. Higher savings induce higher unintended bequest.
This income redistribution towards future generations reduces labor supply in the long
run10. The increase in tax revenues from capital taxation is stronger than the decrease
from labor taxation. Therefore tax revenues from income taxation are rising over the
transition and since the consumption tax rate is time-independent (see (24)) public debt
increases too.
Since private annuity markets are missing, the pay-as-you-go pension system provides an
(implicit) insurance against outliving ones resources. On the other hand, the beneﬁts of
the private system are not annuitized by assumption. Consequently, the insurance provi-
sion is lost after privatization and Table 3 reports for simulation (4) signiﬁcant eﬃciency
losses for all cases considered. The case of rational consumers with non-stochastic income
was already considered in Hubbard and Judd (1987). Note that hyperbolic consumers are
stronger aﬀected than rational consumers. The reason is that young hyperbolic consumers
discount their very old-age consumption much less than rational consumers, see Figure 1.
As a consequence, the value of the annuity provision is higher for hyperbolic consumers.
Note that the parametrization of simulation (4) is very similar compared to ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu
et al. (2003). Our results conﬁrm their conclusions for high short-run discount rates
although their calculations do not include transitional periods.
In order to reproduce the initial equilibria of Table 1, we still have to introduce the pro-
gressive tax system as described in the previous section. This is done in simulation (5)
where compared to simulation (4) the tax base has changed (i.e. dw > 0,d s > 0) and the
German tax rate schedule of 2005 is substituted. In order to understand the eﬀects of the
progressive tax schedule, we ﬁrst discuss the labor supply eﬀects. Here we have to dis-
tinguish between changes in the age-proﬁle and the level of marginal income taxes. Since
10Note that in simulation (3) without bequests labor supply only falls by 0.4 percent!
22marginal income tax rates increase with age, the decreasing marginal contribution rate of
the pay-as-you-go system ﬂattens the age-proﬁle of the marginal tax wedge. Some back-
of-the-envelope calculations show that overall marginal taxes are slightly hump-shaped
and vary between 25 (at age 20-24) and 28 percent (at age 55-59) in the initial equilib-
rium. The introduction of the private system steepens the age-proﬁle of the marginal tax
wedge. Now agents face a marginal tax wedge of 21 percent in the initial working period
which increases steadily to 33 percent at the end of working life. Consequently, labor
supply is shifted toward the beginning of working life which in turn increases savings and
reduces long run labor supply compared to the case with proportional taxes, see the last
two columns of Table 2.
Of course, due to the rising labor supply elasticity across the life cycle, this age-proﬁle ef-
fect increases labor supply distortions. In addition, the rising interest income from savings
increases the marginal tax rate on labor income and allows to reduce the consumption
tax. This change from consumption to income taxes reduces economic eﬃciency as al-
ready shown in Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ (1987). Labor supply and tax structure eﬀects
mainly explain the eﬃciency losses in the case of non-stochastic income of Table 3. With
stochastic income, the explanation is complicated by the implied insurance eﬀects of the
tax structure. As Nishiyama and Smetters (2005b) have recently shown, consumption
tax systems provide less insurance against income shocks than progressive income tax
systems and the latter eﬀect might even outweigh the increased labor supply distortions.
This reasoning also applies to our simulation. The reduction of consumption taxes im-
proves the insurance properties of the tax system which overcompensates the increased
labor supply distortions and improves economic eﬃciency as shown in the stochastic in-
come case of Table 3. Hyperbolic consumers experience a stronger eﬃciency loss with
non-stochastic income and a weaker eﬃciency gain with stochastic income compared to
rational consumers. This is due to the fact that in both cases the rising capital income
after privatization increases the marginal tax rate, so that their already excessive con-
sumption in young age is further increased by privatization.
Although our central interest are the aggregate eﬃciency eﬀects of eliminating social
security, it might also be interesting to compare the intra- and intergenerational wel-
fare eﬀects of the considered benchmark reforms. Table 4 reports for the two bench-
mark reforms with rational consumers the resulting welfare eﬀects for diﬀerent cohorts
in the reform year and the long run if no compensation transfers are implemented.
The reported intragenerational disaggregation reﬂects the realized productivity level:
“Poor”individuals are those 10 percent of the population with the lowest realized produc-
tivity level, “median”individuals are those 20 percent who realize the forth productivity
23level and “rich”individuals are those 20 percent of the population who realize the highest
productivity level. With proportional taxes, the already retired generations are gaining
slightly, while the middle-aged generations are losing and young and future generations
are gaining signiﬁcantly. Of course, the welfare gains for the already retired are due to
the slight reduction in consumption taxes reported in Table 2. Note that there is almost
no diﬀerence between income classes. The signiﬁcant losses of the middle-aged are due to
the fact that in the current German system the implicit tax rate falls signiﬁcantly before
retirement, see Figure 2. Consequently, the considered reform raises the payroll tax rates
for those cohorts. Since poor individuals work more than rich ones, the former are hurt
stronger than the latter. In addition, the medium generations do not receive much unin-
tended bequests from their predecessors. However, they have to save more now in order
to insure against live span uncertainty. Young and future generations mainly gain for two
reasons. First, they pay lower payroll taxes after the reform since their implicit tax rate
in the initial equilibrium was higher than the payroll tax rate after the reform, see again
Figure 2. In addition, they also beneﬁt from the increased unintended bequests11.N o t e
that poor individuals realize especially strong welfare gains in the long run since their
liquidity constraints are relaxed due to higher bequests and the lower payroll tax rate.
Table 4: Welfare eﬀects of social security with rational consumers
Age in The benchmark reform with stochastic income
reform proportional taxes progressive taxes
year poor median rich poor median rich
90-94 0.63 0.57 0.51 1.68 1.50 1.36
80-84 0.61 0.52 0.45 1.61 1.42 1.29
60-64 0.55 0.47 0.40 1.46 1.29 1.14
40-44 -3.49 -2.69 -1.47 -2.93 -2.55 -2.32
20-24 0.67 -0.94 -1.13 1.16 -0.59 -1.35
00-04 2.66 1.15 0.85 3.00 1.36 0.62
∞ 6.14 4.56 4.54 6.26 4.60 4.36
aChanges are reported in percentage of initial ressources.
The right part of Table 4 reports the welfare consequences when a progressive tax is
levied initially. Of course, the welfare gains for pensioners are signiﬁcantly stronger now
since the consumption tax rate is reduced much stronger, see Table 2. With progressive
taxes, poor medium-aged individuals lose less while rich ones lose more compared to the
proportional tax case. Marginal taxes increase for both types but since excess burdens
11In simulation (3) there are only slight gains for generations living in the long run!
24increase quadratic in tax rates, eﬃciency losses are higher for rich individuals.
We do not report the welfare eﬀects for hyperbolic individuals. For retired agents they
are very similar as those reported in Table 4. On the other hand, the welfare losses of
working-age agents are higher and the welfare gains of future agents are lower in the
hyperbolic case. The diﬀerence reﬂects the higher aggregate eﬃciency loss of hyperbolic
agents which was reported and already explained in Table 3.
4.4 Sensitivity analysis
In this section we report the sensitivity of our results with respect to some central prefer-
ence parameters. In order to save space, we restrict our attention to aggregate eﬃciency
eﬀects of Table 3. In Simulation (3a) assume that consumers are completely risk neutral
(i.e. η =0 .0). In this case they will reduce their precautionary savings already in the
initial equilibrium so that the borrowing constraint is more binding for poor individuals.
As a consequence, the elimination of social security now induces a stronger (positive)
liquidity eﬀect compared to simulation (3). Of course, the same reasoning also applies to
the precautionary motive against lifespan uncertainty. Therefore, risk neutral consumers
are much better oﬀ than risk avers consumers when life span uncertainty is taken into
account. On the other hand, risk neutral consumers do not need the insurance provision
of the tax system. Consequently, with progressive taxes they are worse oﬀ than the risk
avers consumers.
Next we return to the original assumption about risk aversion and assume that the in-
tertemporal substitution elasticity γ is reduced from 0.5 to 0.25. As a consequence, the
optimal consumption proﬁle becomes ﬂatter, so that liquidity constraints in the initial
equilibrium are binding much stronger. Again, the stronger (positive) liquidity eﬀect
from privatization explains the higher eﬃciency gains in all cases considered.
In simulations (3c), (4c) and (5c) the intratemporal elasticity ρ is reduced from 0.6 to 0.2,
which reduces the compensated elasticity of labor supply from 0.34 to 0.17. The relevant
issue for labor supply considerations is the change from falling to ﬂat tax rates over the
life cycle. Due to the labor-supply elasticity proﬁles for stochastic (certain) income, the
reduced elasticities increase (decrease) welfare gains in simulation (3c) compared with (3).
On the other hand, the reduced labor supply elasticity also dampens the ability to insure
against lifespan risk. Consequently, eﬃciency losses with uncertain income are higher
with a low labor supply elasticity. Finally, a reduced labor supply elasticity dampens the
distortions from the progressive tax system. This explains the lower eﬃciency losses in
all experiments of simulation (5c) compared to the respective ones of simulation (5).
25Next, we strengthen the present-bias of hyperbolic consumers by reducing the short-run
discount factor β from 0.75 to 0.6 while increasing the long-run discount factor δ from 1.0
to 1.1 in order to obtain the same initial capital-output ratio, see Figure 1. This para-
metrization is in line with ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu et al. (2003) and it clearly isolates our central
argument. As shown in simulations (4d) and (5d), if the economy would be populated
with consumers that feature a strong hyperbolic discounting, the eﬃciency losses from
privatization of social security would be much higher. The intuition is straight forward:
The stronger preferences are biased towards the presence, the more do consumers honor
social security as a commitment device against these distorted believes. Additional, strong
hyperbolic consumers discount their very old age consumption less than hyperbolic con-
sumers, see Figure 1. Therefore, they suﬀer more from abolishing annuities. If we apply
the strong hyperbolic parametrization to “sophisticated”consumers, the value function
exhibits diﬀerent local maxima. Consequently, it would require more sophisticated tech-
niques to obtain the optimum12.
If we adjust in the case of proportional taxes the government budget by payroll taxes
instead of consumption taxes, our results would also hardly be aﬀected. Of course this is
due to the fact that in this case the consumption tax rate adjusts only slightly. Finally, it
is also possible to eliminate social security in a closed economy since the initial equilibrium
with progressive taxes of Table 1 is calibrated as a closed economy. As shown in simulation
(5e) of Table 3 this assumption has almost no impact on the results. The reason is, of
course, that most of the increase in assets reported in Table 2 is balanced by rising public
and pension debt.
5 Discussion
The results of this paper strongly suggest that social security plays a positiv role if Ger-
many is populated by hyperbolic consumers, while the results are mixed for rational
consumers. For our central parametrization social security induces an overall welfare gain
which amounts to roughly 1.5 percent of aggregate resources in the hyperbolic model and
a welfare loss of about 0.5 percent of resources in the model with rational consumers. Our
simulations also identify and isolate quantitatively the central eﬀects which are at work.
Social security provides an insurance against lifespan uncertainty and serves as a commit-
ment device for hyperbolic consumers, at the same time it also increases the borrowing
12Laibson et al. (1998) who simulate hyperbolic discounting with sophisticated believes report that
they observe stongly nonmonotonic and noncontinuous consumption functions for low values of β.
26constraints for young households. It’s important to note that social security induces only
small distortions of life-cycle labor supply. Consequently, the immediate policy implica-
tions for Germany are twofold. First, reform proposals such as Fenge et al. (2006) which
intend to alter the weights of the German point system ﬁnd only weak support. Second,
proposals which call for the introduction of a basic allowance for contributions ﬁnd a
strong support, since such reforms reduce initial borrowing constraints.
As we consider an intragenerationally fair social security system which does not redis-
tribute within generations, there is no insurance provision against income uncertainty.
However, Fehr and Habermann (2005) have shown in a companion paper that a more
progressive social security system would increase aggregate eﬃciency in Germany. If our
initial social security system reﬂects the optimal progressivity as suggested by Fehr and
Habermann (2005), the elimination would yield an overall eﬃciency loss of 2.8 percent
of aggregate resources even for rational consumers with uncertain income. This ﬁnding
indicates that social security might play an even stronger positive role in countries such
as the US or UK where it clearly redistributes within generations. This supports the
results of Nishiyama and Smetters (2005a) who found aggregate eﬃciency losses when
they scaled down the US social security system. On the other hand, our results are in
contrast with most of the previous literature which either compares only steady states or
compensates transitional generations not adequately.
Appendix A: Computational Method
In order to compute a solution we have to discretize the state space. The state of a
household is determined by zj =( j,aj,ep j,e j) ∈J× A×P×Ej where J = {1,...,J},A=
{a1,...,anA},P = {ep1,...,ep nP} and Ej = {e1
j,...,e
nE
j } are discrete sets. In this paper
we use J =1 6 ,n A =6 0 ,n P =1 5a n dnE = 6. The initial values for eﬃciencies are:
ξ(1,0,0,e 1
1)=ξ(1,0,0,e 2
1)=0 .1a n dξ(1,0,0,e 3
1)=···= ξ(1,0,0,e 6
1)=0 .2.
For all these possible states zj we compute the optimal decision of households from (5).
The pension grid is equidistant while the asset grid has increasing intervals between two
grid points. This is useful since the value function is heavily curved for low values of
assets. Since u(cj,  j) is not diﬀerentiable in every (cj,  j)a n dV (zj+1) is only known in a
discrete set of points zj+1 ∈{ j +1}×A×P ×Ej, this maximization problem can not be
solved analytically. Therefore we have to use the following numerical maximization and
interpolation algorithms to compute households optimal decision:
1. Compute (5) in age J for all possible zJ.N o t i c et h a tV (zJ+1) = 0 and households are
not allowed to work anymore. Hence, in the optimum households should consume
everything they have.
272. For j = J − 1,...,1:
Find (5) for all possible zj by using Powell’s algorithm (Press et. al., 2001, 406ﬀ.).
Since this algorithm requires a continuous function, we have to interpolate V (zj+1).
Having computed the data V (zj+1) for all zj+1 ∈{ j +1 }×A × P × Ej in the last






for all l =1 ,...,n A and m =1 ,...,n P. In this paper we use multidimensional
cubic spline interpolation, i.e. sj : S3 ×S 3 → R,w h e r e a sS3 is the space of all
one-dimensional, twice continuously diﬀerentiable, piecewise third-order polynomial
functions and S3 ×S 3 its tensor product (cf. Judd (1998, 225ﬀ.)). Further infor-
mation is available upon request. The multidimensional cubic spline interpolation
allows a reduction of nA and nP to only a few points with the same accuracy as
multidimensional line interpolation. Since spline interpolation is problematic if as-
sets can be negative, we need multidimensional line interpolation in this cases and
set nA = 60. For all simulations without negative assets nA = 12 would not change
results in an perceivable way.
Appendix B: Sensitivity analysis regarding J,nA and nP
If we increase the number of periods J in order to reduce the period length, we would
have to recalculate the age- and productivity dependent distribution scheme Γ(j,ej)a s
well as the Markov transition matrix. To avoid this time demanding recalculation, we
consider for these sensitivity calculations only the certain income case and assume that
only agents at the age of jR −1 receive bequests. Given these assumptions, the eﬃciency
gain of reform (5) for rational agents changes from -2.81 (as reported in Table 3) to -2.83.
This result is computed with nA =6 0a n dnP = 15. If we lowered nA =1 2a n dnP =5
we obtained -2.80. It is obvious that welfare eﬀects would not change signiﬁcantly if the
grid would be ﬁner than nA =6 0a n dnP = 15.
Next, we change J keeping nA constant at 20 and nP at 15. From our assumptions made
above, the eﬃciency gain of reform (4) for rational agents changes from -0.95 (in Table
3) to -1.03. If now J is increased from 16 to 40 we obtain -0.99. Similar changes can be
reported for other parameter combinations. Therefore, we are very optimistic that our
central qualitative results would not change if we reduce the models’ period length to a
year in the uncertainty model.
28Appendix C: Markov transition matrices
Age dependent Markov transition matrices
Age 20-24 Age 25-29
Future productivity level Future productivity level
123456 123456
1 0.30 0.16 0.27 0.07 0.06 0.13 0.31 0.17 0.22 0.08 0.10 0.11
2 0.15 0.18 0.19 0.24 0.12 0.13 0.15 0.22 0.28 0.13 0.10 0.11
Current 3 0.07 0.18 0.39 0.17 0.12 0.08 0.08 0.11 0.33 0.25 0.14 0.09
productivity 4 0.09 0.07 0.15 0.33 0.22 0.15 0.08 0.08 0.21 0.31 0.22 0.09
level 5 0.07 0.05 0.13 0.24 0.34 0.17 0.05 0.05 0.12 0.21 0.32 0.24
6 0.05 0.04 0.10 0.12 0.23 0.46 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.12 0.22 0.46
Age 30-34 Age 35-39
Future productivity level Future productivity level
123456 123456
1 0.33 0.22 0.21 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.37 0.20 0.22 0.13 0.05 0.05
2 0.18 0.25 0.30 0.14 0.05 0.07 0.22 0.29 0.32 0.12 0.03 0.02
Current 3 0.09 0.15 0.35 0.24 0.11 0.06 0.12 0.16 0.38 0.20 0.09 0.05
productivity 4 0.07 0.06 0.24 0.33 0.21 0.09 0.04 0.04 0.24 0.40 0.22 0.07
level 5 0.05 0.02 0.11 0.24 0.38 0.20 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.21 0.44 0.22
6 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.08 0.23 0.58 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.22 0.63
Age 40-44 Age 45-49
Future productivity level Future productivity level
123456 123456
1 0.49 0.24 0.15 0.04 0.06 0.02 0.45 0.26 0.22 0.04 0.01 0.01
2 0.17 0.31 0.36 0.09 0.05 0.03 0.15 0.32 0.33 0.14 0.03 0.03
Current 3 0.07 0.13 0.40 0.25 0.10 0.05 0.08 0.11 0.44 0.27 0.07 0.02
productivity 4 0.06 0.06 0.20 0.40 0.21 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.16 0.40 0.29 0.06
level 5 0.02 0.02 0.09 0.21 0.47 0.18 0.04 0.02 0.08 0.19 0.46 0.20




1 0.42 0.22 0.21 0.07 0.04 0.04
2 0.14 0.30 0.35 0.11 0.06 0.04
Current 3 0.11 0.12 0.37 0.25 0.11 0.03
productivity 4 0.04 0.05 0.19 0.41 0.24 0.07
level 5 0.04 0.03 0.09 0.20 0.45 0.19
6 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.15 0.66
Source: Authors’ own calculations from 1984-2001 SOEP data
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